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HOW TO DIVIDE A TERRITORY: AN ARGUMENT IN
FAVOR OF PRIVATE PROPERTY

In many reallife situations, from conicts between neighbors to conicts between
states, there is a dispute over a territory, as a result of which none of the
sides can use this territory eciently. In such situations, it is desirable
to come up withe mutually benecial agreement.
Dividing a disputed territory: a real-life problem.

Conict situations in
which there are solutions which are better that status quo for all the
participants are known as cooperative games. Such games were analyzed
almost immediately after the emergence, in the 1940s, of game theory 
methodologies for solving conict situations.
In 1951, a future Nobelist John Nash showed that under certain
reasonable assumption, the optimal solution if the one for which the
product of the utilities is the largest possible. This solution is known as
Nash's bargaining solution [24].
Our approach: Nash's bargaining solution.

to divide a territory: what is known. In [1, 5], Nash's
bargaining solution is applied to the problem of dividing a disputed
territory. Let X be the territory. For each point x ∈ X , let ui (x) denote
the utility of the location x to the i-th participant. We need to divide
n
∪
the set X into n disjoint subsets Si :
Si = X and Si ∩ Sj = ∅ for i ̸= j .
How

i=1

If we allocate, to the i-th participant, a part Si ⊆ X of this
disputed
∫ territory, the utility ui of this participant will be equal to
ui = Si ui (x) dx. Nash's bargaining solution means that we select a
division of the original territory X into sets S1 , . . . , Sn for which the
n
∏
product
ui is the largest possible.
i=1

The solution to this optimization problem is as follows: we select
some threshold values ti , and assign a point x ∈ X to the set Si for

1

which the ratio ui (x)/ti is the largest possible. We select the values ti
n
∏
ui is the largest possible.
for which the product
i=1

In particular, for the case n = 2, when a conict has only two sides, we
def
have a threshold t = t1 /t2 for which x ∈ S1 if and only if u1 (x)/u2 (x) ≥
t.
The above formalization assumes that every
location in the disputed territory should be allocated to one of the sides.
But if several sides have interest, why not propose a joint control?
This has been done on the past in many areas: there was a joint
British-Egyptian control of Sudan, joint allied control over Austria, over
parts of Germany, etc.
Why not joint control?

of the new optimization problem. In this new
formulation, instead of allocating a location x to one of the n sides of
the conict, we need to come up with the weights wi (x) that describe
the degree of control of the i-th side over this location. These weights
n
∑
should, of course, add up to 1:
wi (x) = 1.
Formalization

i=1

In this∫ new formulation, the utility ui of the i-th participant is equal
to ui = X wi (x) · ui (x) dx, and we need to select functions wi (x) for
which
)
n
n (∫
∏
∏
wi (x) · ui (x) dx
u=
ui =
i=1

i=1

is maximized under the constraint

X
n
∑

wi (x) = 1 for each x ∈ X .

i=1
the new optimization problem. Lagrange multiplier
method reduces the above constraint optimization problem to the
following unconstrained problem
)
( n
) ∫
n (∫
∑
∏
def
wi (x) − 1 dx → max
J =
wi (x) · ui (x) dx + λ(x) ·
Solving

i=1

X

i=1

wi (x)

for wi (x) ∈ [0, 1]. When the optimal value wi (x) is inside the range [0, 1],
i.e., when 0 < wi (x) < 1, the derivative of the objective function J with
respect to wi (x) must be equal to 0. So, for such locations x, we get
def ∏
Ci · ui (x) + λ(x) = 0, where we denoted Ci =
uj .
j̸=i

2

From 0 < wi (x) < 1 and

n
∑

wj (x) = 1, it follows that there is at least

j=1

one other participant k for which 0 < wk (x)  and this, 0 < wk (x) < 1.
For this k , we similarly have Ck · uk (x) + λ(x) = 0, hence ui (x)/uk (x) =
Ck /Ci .
So, all the points for which 0 < wi (x) < 1, i.e., all the
points of joint control, must be located on one the areas
Conclusion.

{x : ui (x)/uk (x) = Ck /Ci }.
For generic functions ui (x) and for each constant Ck /Ci , this area has
co-dimension 1  a 0-dimensional point in a 1-D line, a 1-D line in a 2-D
space, etc. Thus, this area has measure 0. So, locations from this area do
not contribute to the corresponding integrals ui and can, thus, be safely
ignored.
And if we have a whole block of locations x for which ui (x)/uk (x) =
const, then instead of partial control we can as well divide this region
between the i-th and the k -th participants, the utilities will not change.
For all other locations, we have wi (x) = 0 or wi (x) = 1. Thus, joint
control is never optimal: Nash's bargaining solution implies that each
location x is assigned to one of the participants.
In the above text, we talked about dividing a disputed
territory, but the same argument can be repeated in other practical
situations when we have an ownership dispute. For such general
situations, our conclusion provides an argument for private property (as
opposed to communal one).
Comment.
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